1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
2	DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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4	SREYNUON LUNN,)
5	Plaintiff,)
6	vs.) CA No. 17-10938-IT
7	YOLANDA SMITH, et al,) Defendants.)
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10	BEFORE: THE HONORABLE JUDGE INDIRA TALWANI
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12	HEARING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
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15	John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse Courtroom No. 9
16	One Courthouse Way Boston, MA 02210
17	Thursday, June 22, 2017 2:30 p.m.
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20	Cheryl Dahlstrom, RMR, CRR
21	Official Court Reporter John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse
22	One Courthouse Way, Room 3510 Boston, MA 02210
23	Mechanical Steno - Transcript by Computer
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PROCEEDINGS

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THE CLERK: U.S. District Court is now in session.

The Honorable Judge Indira Talwani presiding. This is Case No.

17-cv-10938, Lunn v. Smith, et al. Will counsel please identify themselves for the record.

MS. LAFAILLE: Good afternoon, your Honor. Adriana LaFaille here with Matthew Segal on behalf of Mr. Lunn.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MS. CONNOLLY: Good afternoon, your Honor. Kathleen Connolly on behalf of the respondents in this case.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

So I've got two motions in front of me. With regard to the motion to -- for reconsideration on the dismissal of the federal defendants, I assume -- there's no opposition to it and you're here. We're arguing this on the mootness grounds. So I assume either you're going to prevail on the mootness grounds, in which case I suppose the motion for reconsideration is itself moot; or if I deny the motion to dismiss on the grounds of mootness, you would not disagree that there's some proper party at that point that needs to be substituted in. Right now I have only the sheriff, I believe.

MS. CONNOLLY: That's correct, your Honor. With respect to the claim they asserted in their petition, it's our position that is moot; and, therefore, we did not file an opposition.

THE COURT: Either way, I don't need to worry about that motion. We'll worry -- the motion to dismiss is moot.

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MS. CONNOLLY: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: So that's your motion so I'll let you start.

MS. CONNOLLY: Thank you, your Honor. As this Court is aware, it's respondent's position that this case is moot.

Mr. Lunn, in his habeas petition, challenged his detention by ICE. Mr. Lunn was released on May 25, 2017. Therefore, his challenge, his requested relief, has been granted and the case is moot.

Now, your Honor, to the extent that Mr. Lunn is asking this Court to issue a future injunction barring ICE from re-detaining him without first coming to this court, such request is improper for a number of reasons. First of all, your Honor, inasmuch as he's requesting ICE come to this court -- or the government come to this court to say it's reasonably likely that he will be removed in the foreseeable future, that's actually prohibited by the REAL ID Act, specifically 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(g), which would prohibit the district court from issuing an opinion related to a decision by the Attorney General to, in relevant part, execute a removal order, which is essentially, I believe, what they're asking this court to do, is say issue an injunction prohibiting this action, which is a direct, in that circumstance, execution of removal order.

THE COURT: Let me just back you up a few steps and go a little bit sort of starting with basics here. This is a motion to dismiss on the grounds that it is moot, and you are bringing that as a subject matter jurisdiction argument.

You're not simply saying they didn't comply with the statutory requirements under the habeas statute of custody but rather the not in custody makes -- leaves us with no case in controversy.

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MS. CONNOLLY: That is correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: So the record in front of me is not just the complaint and the allegations in the complaint but as augmented by the affidavits, et cetera, that are -- the rest of the record that's in front of me.

MS. CONNOLLY: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And with regard to the specific facts that I'm dealing with, which seems like it would be helpful for me to understand that, I'm a little -- I'm having a hard time constructing sort of the factual story as both sides have put it. And let me sort of focus in on where my question is because I think this might get a little bit to the heart of the matter of what the terms of release are and what's the ability to revoke essentially, and that is, that he -- Mr. Lunn was released under -- on conditions originally in 2008, correct?

MS. CONNOLLY: That is correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Was that release pursuant to 241.13 or

1 241.4?

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MS. CONNOLLY: Your Honor, I don't know specifically which -- under which regulatory authority that release was. I do know that ICE determined it was unable to get travel documents to remove him and, therefore, released him under an order of supervision. I do not know precisely which regulation it was under.

THE COURT: But it was following -- as I understand this process, if they are unable to get documents and they make that determination, they then do a release, supervised release; and if at some point it later becomes possible to get documentations, the individual can be brought back in.

MS. CONNOLLY: That is one of the circumstances in which they could be brought back in, that's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: The reason I'm focusing on this is that it seems that if he is released pursuant to 241.13 and he's revoked -- he's brought back in because of violations of his conditions, there's a procedure there that says he can be held for six months, and there's a procedure saying, if it's more serious, you could have criminal charges brought. I think the petitioner is arguing that you would be limited to criminal charges and so forth. But there's a set of debates if that's the way we're proceeding.

If, on the other hand, there is no determination that

we don't have travel documents but there's simply -- well, strike that. Even under the 24.13 -- 241.13 release, if at some point it becomes evident that you could get the travel documents, you could bring him in for that reason as well.

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MS. CONNOLLY: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Alternatively, if he's released under 241.4, then we have this language that seemed troublesome to the Ninth Circuit and to <u>Clark</u> saying, well, if the individual can be revoked simply in the discretion -- exercise of unlimited discretion, then we have this problem. So it seems sort of -- for me to focus on the mootness question, I need to know the context of the release.

MS. CONNOLLY: Sure, your Honor. And, first of all, I will note that the title of Section 241 -- of Regulation 241.13 is dealing with the determination when there's a significant likelihood of removing a detained alien.

Now, I can say -- I don't know about the 2008 order.

I can tell you the release notification that we have before us today -- and that was attached to, I believe, the opposition as Exhibit B -- discusses you may be brought back in if you violate the conditions of release, one of which is potentially being rearrested on criminal charges.

Certainly, there's no -- the release notification is not in any way suggesting that ICE is going to pick someone up -- I've read Clark. Certainly, I've seen the language that is

concerning to the Court -- that ICE is just going to willy-nilly pick someone up, I think the language is, that the circumstances of release have been met. That's certainly not what we have in front of us, your Honor.

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What we have in front of us is a release notification indicating that there's two essentially main ways that he would get picked up again. One is violating the terms of his supervision, which includes, of course, as a subsection, being criminally arrested and charged. The second is if it becomes reasonably foreseeable that his removal is likely to be removed either to Cambodia or to a third country.

THE COURT: So both of those things seem to -- those seem appropriate within this administrative scheme. The part where I'm having a little trouble, and I think speaks to the concern expressed in the petitioner's paper, is if he could just be subject to being picked up without one of those two things being triggered. And the language in the declaration that you filed with the reply brief describing what had happened in the past said, well, he was picked up because he had violated these state laws. That part seemed fine. But then it continued in each of the cases and said and so, once he's picked up, we've started again figuring out whether we can get travel documents.

And the part of that that's problematic for me is that if it is the position that the -- he could be picked up simply

for initiating again trying to find documents — trying to get authorization, then that would suggest he could just be picked up at any time as opposed to one of two things — concrete things happening. Either he has, in fact, violated a condition or sufficient progress has been made in obtaining travel documents that removal is reasonably foreseeable but that you couldn't just pick him up to say, okay, whenever we have a little bit of time on our docket we'll pick people up and start the process anew. That would seem to be inconsistent with —

MS. CONNOLLY: Your Honor, if your Court -- your Honor, I think that's explicitly laid out in Zadvydas.

Certainly, it's not -- in the deposition, where I think there was no -- stating we've picked him up three times: 2008, 2009, and this current detention. In each of those times, it was because he violated his conditions of release. And so one of the things they need to do is look again at those conditions.

However, it's not working in a bubble, your Honor.

Certainly, he's violated his conditions of release. He's been rearrested. He's brought again to ICE's detention for violating those conditions of release. And so they're going to look and see have country conditions changed. Is he now likely to get the travel documents such that he could be removed to Cambodia or to a third country?

ICE is not picking him up just to see if they could start that process anew. And I agree with the Court on that.

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And the government and the respondents agree with the Court on that. Certainly, I think the Zadvydas court language is clear that if he violates his conditions of release that is an appropriate reason for him to be detained but not just picking him up willy-nilly.

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THE COURT: So I think the point of divergence might be the following: Mr. Lunn does -- you're saying that it's the government's position that if Mr. Lunn doesn't do anything to violate the terms of his conditions of release until there is a substantial likelihood that he can now be removed he wouldn't be picked up. But you're then saying, but if he is picked up for violating, we can then keep him while we are trying to figure out whether we can get the travel papers again. And I'm questioning, once you pick him up, isn't the appropriate question simply what's the proper punishment for violating these conditions of release and that that is sort of on a separate track from the question of let's start all over and get the documents?

MS. CONNOLLY: Well, your Honor, a couple of things to that point. First of all, with the exception of this -- if the violation would result in criminal charges, the detention is not a punitive thing. There's two purposes of detention in the immigration context, which is to see can this person be removed. They've got a final order. Can they be removed? And then, certainly, we look at their conditions of release. Can

1 we effect these conditions? Can we alter these conditions?

ICE -- certainly, country conditions change over time, your Honor, and so, yes, he, on those occasions, was brought in and picked up because he's violated his release. But ICE at that time is looking to say, okay, have things changed such that his removal is reasonably foreseeable now? Certainly, that is not prohibited under the language of Zadvydas. That's not prohibited by the statutes or regulations. It's not -- the government agrees with --

THE COURT: Actually, I would say the following: Not only is it not prohibited but the government -- there's nothing to suggest the government shouldn't be trying to find out this question all the time once there's a final order of removal.

I think my only question is: Do you detain him for that reason? If you're detaining him for the fact that he has violated his conditions of release -- you're saying it's not punitive, but it does seem you have authority to -- under 241.13, you have authority to hold him. "The alien may be continued in detention for an additional six months in order to effect the alien's removal, if possible, and to effect the conditions under which the alien had been released."

I guess it isn't a punitive -- to effect the conditions may be a punitive or may be trying to get compliance with conditions.

MS. CONNOLLY: And also to see if -- has the country

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conditions changed at this point such that he is now reasonably likely to be removed.

I will note, your Honor, that on all of the occasions that ICE then released him from custody it was upon a fresh determination, no, it's not reasonably foreseeable that he's likely to be removed so -- at this time. And so ICE is looking at both of those, but ICE would not, as the Court asked earlier, just say, all right. We're ready to start looking into this again. Let's just pick him up for no reason. That's not at all what ICE is doing. That's not what his release order indicates ICE will do. That's not what Zadvydas stands for.

Certainly, he -- when they pick him up -- it's one of these things where they pick him up. He's violated his conditions. He's brought to their forefront as more of a priority. Let's see if country conditions have changed. Let's see if he can be removed now. He's had this final order since 2008. Just because he was not removable back then does not mean that things have not changed such that he could be removable now. And so that is happening when he is detained.

THE COURT: But just to be very clear, the government does not take the position that he is subject to detention at the outset of looking in again to find out whether we can get the travel papers in the absence of his violations?

MS. CONNOLLY: That is correct, your Honor.

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THE COURT: Okay. So let me see if that portion of the argument, I can hear some response from petitioner's counsel.

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MS. LAFAILLE: Good afternoon, your Honor. Your Honor's questions are going to the heart of the dispute on the merits here. Your Honor is describing the circumstance that Mr. Lunn believes would be constitutional, or at least as I understand what your Honor is describing, a circumstance in which he could only be taken into custody if he violated his conditions and were subject to criminal prosecution for that violation.

THE COURT: Okay. So that's a divergence there.

You're saying that you think that if he -- if the matter is not referred for criminal prosecution, then he could not be brought in?

MS. LAFAILLE: Unless there was a reasonable -- there was a significant likelihood that his removal is reasonably foreseeable.

THE COURT: Putting that aside, just turning to the violation of the conditions of release, are you saying that this section under 241.13 -- I understand there are problems with 241.4. But under 241.13, where it says that they can detain him for six months, are you saying that that only applies if they also seek criminal charges, or are you saying it doesn't apply at all and it's unconstitutional or improper?

And there's the language here --

2 MS. LAFAILLE: Right.

THE COURT: -- that says -- this is under 241.13(i), "Revocation of Release."

MS. LAFAILLE: Right. So I'd like to distinguish, your Honor, maybe what we think would be the rule in this case if we win versus the circumstance that Mr. Lunn finds himself in now. And the debate that we're having here with the government demonstrates very clearly that the circumstance that Mr. Lunn finds himself in now is very different than the one he would find himself in if he were to prevail in his habeas.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm not sure I see the differences, so why don't you tell me those.

MS. LAFAILLE: So if he were to prevail -- and this case is squarely on point with <u>Clark</u>, and this is the point made by the Supreme Court in <u>Clark</u>. If the petitioner there were to prevail, just like Mr. Lunn, he would be subject to re-detention if removal were reasonably foreseeable or if he were being criminally prosecuted for a violation of conditions.

But what cannot happen is simply being brought in to be essentially held punitively in civil detention, without trial, because of a violation of conditions to begin a process of exploration of removal to a country where he has never stepped foot and has continuously denied that he's a citizen.

THE COURT: So I have concerns about the beginning the

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process of trying to make this determination. But I am not sure I can go as far as you're suggesting that to say that the government has the obligation to let people out of detention after a certain period of time. They're permitted to do that with conditions of release but that the only way they can enforce the conditions of release is by bringing a new criminal prosecution, and that in the absence of a new criminal prosecution -- so, for example, if the individual is supposed to be checking in every few months with the office to see what's happened with -- whether some more documents are needed or something. They're supposed to be showing up to do that and he just doesn't show. What I hear you're saying is they don't have the option of just pulling him in for a while, but they would rather have to refer it to the U.S. Attorney for criminal prosecution.

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MS. LAFAILLE: Well, government counsel alluded to the fact that someone who violates their conditions might become a higher priority, and that exploration could certainly begin while someone was out of custody. And perhaps that person would find themselves in a situation they didn't want to be in if they suddenly became a higher priority for ICE to obtain their travel documents.

But I think what we're getting at here is that, regardless of whether at the merits we completely persuade you of our point of view, we're still talking about a circumstance

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          here that's different than the custody that Mr. Lunn currently
          finds himself in, and that's why there is relief that this
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          court can order which, again, we hope would follow briefing on
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          the merits but --
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                   THE COURT: But your argument is premised on my
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          finding this regulation then invalid. This regulation says
          that in these circumstances -- and I would give you that it's
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          not clear he was released under --
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                   MS. LAFAILLE: Can I speak to that briefly, your
          Honor?
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                   THE COURT: Yes.
                   MS. LAFAILLE: I think it is quite clear that we're
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          not in 241.13 territory. I think it's clear we're in 241.4.
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                   THE COURT: You say that because of --
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                   MS. LAFAILLE: Because there's -- 241.13 is a
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          headquarters review process.
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                   THE COURT: But there is a -- within 241.13, there are
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          two provisions that seem very important here. One was
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          Subsection (h), which sets the conditions of release --
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                   MS. LAFAILLE: Right.
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                   THE COURT: -- for a person in this circumstance; and
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          the other is Subsection (i), which describes the revocation of
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          release for a person in those circumstances.
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                   MS. LAFAILLE: Right. That's where the procedures of
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          241.13 have been followed, as your Honor pointed out earlier.
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I think --

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THE COURT: And you're saying it has because they've made a determination, in 2008 and then subsequently. At each of those times, they made a determination that his travel documents were not going to be forthcoming.

MS. LAFAILLE: Well, certainly, someone in -- as I read the Piepiora affidavit, someone in ICE in Boston realized that this individual should be released, as they do, right? The folks at the ICE office in Boston review the custody of those who are within their jurisdiction and made a determination to release Mr. Lunn. And we can debate whether that was influenced by this litigation being filed three days earlier or not. But that's quite different than the procedures -- the specific procedures of headquarters review triggered by a non-citizen's request that are outlined in 241.13. And the repeated --

THE COURT: Bear with me. I tend to sometimes think these things through in hypothetical ways because it may be that the outcome here is you're right. This all happened only under 241.4 and you can proceed. And then in a week they're going to reissue this under 241.13, and then we're back into that section. Just bear with me for a minute to sort of push on this point.

If the release was pursuant to 241.13 and the revocation was pursuant to 241.13, that regulation states that

if he is -- if he, among other things, violates his conditions of supervised release, it says he may be in continued -- continued in detention for an additional six months.

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So are you saying that, you know, the case here is only that they haven't gone through this process, they're under 241.14 [sic], and, therefore, we've got this shear discretion revocation -- discretionary revocation, which is suspect under the cases you cited, but that if they had done it here, it would be fine, or are you saying this would be improper as well, and I would not be able to follow the regs here? I would have to invalidate it?

MS. LAFAILLE: Your Honor, I think your Honor's question is if we concede that this regime comports with the requirements of Zadvydas.

THE COURT: That's my question.

MS. LAFAILLE: I don't concede that it does, no, although perhaps there would be a way to interpret it within the limits of the Constitution to provide for an authority that was somewhat narrower than that which I see coming across on the plain text.

What I can look at is the government's treatment of Mr. Lunn to this day has not comported -- whether it's been under this provision or under 241.4, has not comported with the requirements of Zadvydas because, even though there has been no evidence of any reasonable likelihood of removal, the

government has repeatedly detained him simply to begin the process of an exploration into whether they could obtain evidence sufficient to remove him.

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THE COURT: So here's the problem with the logic of that position, though, which is -- their answer is the reason we're picking him up is because he's violating the terms of release. And I've certainly had the arguments in front of me in other cases where somebody is saying -- whether it's a criminal defendant or a situation where they're being detained for other reasons, but people are saying, Let me out while something is being resolved. And the answer is, it's not safe or it's dangerous or there's some risk. And the answer then is always, well, look, we can put in place terms of release.

And that's certainly what happened in Zadvydas, right? There was a lot of argument saying -- pushing back, saying we have to keep these people in prison or in detention. And the push-back was we can give people freedom from custodial -- that type of a situation and at the same time protect the interest that's being pushed by people who are urging detention by having conditions of release.

And what you're saying to me here is but those conditions of release can't really be enforced. I think that's what you're saying, or that the only way that those conditions of release can be enforced is through new criminal procedures.

MS. LAFAILLE: Well, I guess I have two points in

response to that. One is that I think the fact that we're having this discussion demonstrates -- is enough for us to prevail today because it demonstrates that there is relief that Mr. Lunn is seeking and that this court could grant. Now, this court may ultimately disagree with us on the merits, but I think the existence of this discussion is demonstrating that the case is not moot right now and that Mr. Lunn is certainly someone who seeks a ruling from this court that would put him in a very different position than the release that he is under now. And in that respect, I think we're really on all fours with Clark, which is almost -- applying an almost verbatim regulation to the one that I think is at issue here.

THE COURT: Does either side have a document which sets forth his conditions of release?

MS. CONNOLLY: Yes, your Honor.

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THE COURT: It's not part of the record, is it?

MS. CONNOLLY: Yes, your Honor. I believe it was

attached to petitioner's declaration of Kim Nemirow in their opposition. And there's the order of supervision as well as the release notification were both attached to the declaration as part of the opposition. And the order of supervision has the specific things, and the release notification discusses what will happen if he doesn't comply.

THE COURT: Okay. It doesn't say on its face which provision it's under. I'm sorry. You said it says there what

would happen if he violates?

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MS. CONNOLLY: Exhibit B, your Honor, the one right after that, is the release notification addressed to Mr. Lunn explaining that he's subject to these conditions and what will happen if he violates.

THE COURT: Okay. So petitioner at this juncture, you're saying that these conditions of release are improper?

That's the gist of your case in controversy, is saying that he shouldn't be held simply because he violates these things?

MS. LAFAILLE: That's right, your Honor, and that, just as courts have done in <u>Clark</u> and <u>Rodriguez</u>, the Court should adjudicate the merits of the underlying claim, the challenge to the underlying detention, even -- because it's not been rendered moot by the petitioner's release at least.

Certainly, the government --

THE COURT: Isn't the difference between this and Clark, et cetera, is that this doesn't say -- what Clark and Rodriguez said was, look, the government retained the discretion -- the ability -- or Rodriguez says, I guess I should say, is the government retained the ability to simply revoke conditions at its discretion, that that discretion was unlimited and unbridled and, therefore, that couldn't possibly be right, whereas this says we have -- we can revoke your release if you violate these specific provisions. That seems fairly different.

MS. LAFAILLE: Well, nothing here, your Honor, disavows the authority that is -- that 241.4 purports to grant. This is -- it's really exactly the same as <u>Clark</u>, in our view, because there it's not -- there may have been an identical document in <u>Clark</u>, but there was a regulation that provided

broad re-detention authority.

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The same regulation -- again, it's the government's burden, and the government has certainly not shown that these issues are rendered moot because of its -- we're actually under 241.13 or anything like that. 241.4 is really -- is almost verbatim the same as the regulation at issue in Clark. It provides that same authority to re-detain at the government's discretion.

THE COURT: Don't you have to show me that there is some reason to -- even if they have that authority, if I'm trying to look here at whether you survive a mootness challenge when he's now released, I have to look at the likelihood that he will be pulled for no reason or just on their discretion to start it again. And I don't have that.

I have them pulling him for violating a condition. You might have an argument as to the length of time they're keeping him or what they're doing once they're keeping him.

But I don't think I just have -- I don't think I have the question that's posed there, which is simply saying, you know, if someone can be -- have their conditions of release pulled at

the whim, then that's really no different than having you in custody. Here, they're saying, we can have your conditions of release pulled if you violate one of those things. That seems different.

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And so if you can point to why I would think here that the record supports the view that he can be released -- that he has a reasonable -- that it's reasonably likely that he will just be pulled at whim. I mean, we have no past here. I don't think there's any disagreement on this record, is there, that the only times he's being pulled into custody is when he is arrested for a violation of law?

MS. LAFAILLE: But none of that, your Honor, distinguishes this case from <u>Clark</u>. <u>Clark</u> was also not a case where the petitioner demonstrated any likelihood that he would ever be re-detained. In fact, <u>Clark</u> had been released once and had never been re-detained. Here it's even stronger. He actually has been re-detained a couple of times.

I'd also point your Honor to the language in the recent Piepiora declaration which actually says that because the Cambodian documents -- excuse me, the Cambodian consulate may be issuing travel documents. And, again, we're talking about someone who the Cambodian consulate has never recognized as a citizen. But because they may be issuing travel documents to some of their nationals, it will be necessary, is the language of the declaration -- it will be necessary to

re-detain Mr. Lunn for the purpose of taking him to an interview, which he hasn't even been asked to appear at of his own freewill. The government is already --

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THE COURT: I actually found that part the most -very puzzling part of the affidavit. Why would he have to be
detained rather than simply ordered to go to the interview?

MS. CONNOLLY: Sure, your Honor. The background is, is that when these interviews are scheduled -- and they are scheduled as part of the process of removing someone. They're not just scheduling these unless there's an indication the person is likely to be removed. But these interviews have to take place at a central location because the consulate interviews the people. Usually what happens is ICE -- they detain the person, and then often they're relocated outside of the jurisdiction such that the consulate can conduct this interview. And so --

THE COURT: Consulate is -- there's no consulate here in Boston?

MS. CONNOLLY: I don't know if there is or is not a consulate in Boston, your Honor. Certainly, I could get that information to the Court.

What I do know is that, just procedurally speaking, how these interviews take place are often people are taken from wherever they may be in the country to a central location to be interviewed by the consulate. That's why they are taken into

detention.

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But, again, your Honor, that's part of the removal process. So that interview is occurring as part of the reasonably foreseeable -- likelihood that he will be removed. That's part of that. The interview is a step of that. That's when we enter into 1252 land.

THE COURT: I think the question there with that timeline and what you're allowed to do, for whatever time period you're allowed to do it, is you get to do some things while you're holding them in custody. And then it seems, after that, you can keep on trying to do these things; and when it is then foreseeable that they will be able to get the travel documents, you can pull them again. But absent some other problem, to just keep saying we want -- relationships have thawed so we want to start our six months again or start -- I don't think that would be appropriate.

MS. CONNOLLY: No, your Honor. To the extent that that's what this conveyed, that was not what Paragraph 10 was about. It was -- if Cambodia starts issuing -- which we know they've already started doing for their citizens. If it looks like Mr. Lunn specifically is going to be removed, his interview is part of that removal process and so --

THE COURT: If they were to start giving travel documents to individuals who were born in a refugee camp in Thailand, then that would sound like you're getting close. But

simply that they're giving people travel documents wouldn't get you there.

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MS. CONNOLLY: Not at all, your Honor. That's why, certainly, the -- country conditions are always changing, right? None of us can say what's going to happen with the Cambodian -- with these things, with what they're going to be doing or what they are doing. But, certainly, if it is a possibility that Mr. Lunn -- if it's reasonably likely that Mr. Lunn is going to be removed, this interview is a step in that process. They often have to move the petitioner from -- or the alien from where he may be to the location so they can be interviewed at the consulate. It's part of a step of getting the travel documents. So it's part of the removal process itself.

Certainly, I agree with -- I think what the Court's point is -- and the respondents agree -- that just the fact that Cambodia may be issuing travel documents is not reason to pick up Mr. Lunn, absolutely. And, certainly, that's not a circumstance ICE would pick up Mr. Lunn. It's if an interview is scheduled specifically for Mr. Lunn to begin his -- to begin that process of getting the travel documents, which help actually physically his removal, that interview is part of that removal process.

THE COURT: I guess I'm still a little bit of a different understanding of what the Supreme Court has said

here, or maybe it's a different understanding of how travel documents are obtained. But as I understand the inquiry, there is a period of time that is given to the government to hold a person while they are trying to go through these many steps. That time doesn't keep getting restarted simply because political conditions have changed.

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Instead, it seems like you have this initial period of time. When that initial period of time is over, the person is released. If subsequently you get documents and he's now -- it is now foreseeable, then you get to pick him up again. Maybe you don't actually have to have the document. Maybe the government says all things are go. We're just making that last phone call to your current employer, but everything else is already all square. We're in the last step. That might make sense what you're saying.

But to the extent what you're saying is the effort to get travel documents has six different steps and a lot of them happen before a country makes its discretionary decision about what it's going to do, we don't actually have any control about what they're going to do; but once we're in that process, we can pick him up, that doesn't seem consistent with <u>Zadvydas</u>.

MS. CONNOLLY: Certainly, your Honor, if there's changed circumstances such that Cambodia -- and this is a hypothetical. Certainly, if there's changed circumstances such as that Cambodia says we're now accepting back people who fled

during the Khmer Rouge, were born in a refugee camp, parents were Cambodian citizens, we're now recognizing them and returning them back, changed circumstance. That could be a changed circumstance such that his detention would be authorized pursuant to Zadvydas and the line of cases related to this.

I don't -- I don't know, and I certainly am not purporting to assert on behalf of the government, at what stage a foreign entity makes the decision definitely, yes, we are or not going to take this person back. Certainly, it's -- it's the reasonable likelihood language and it's the reasonable likelihood that this person can be removed that we can get these travel documents for this person and have them removed, that is certainly the triggering language under the case law and under the statute.

THE COURT: So just to bring this now back to mootness.

MS. CONNOLLY: Yes.

THE COURT: It is your position that he's currently released, and he won't be picked up again unless he has -- he violates a condition of release and/or those travel documents are now reasonably likely?

MS. CONNOLLY: A changed circumstance, your Honor.

THE COURT: A changed circumstance sufficient to what? What would the --

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MS. CONNOLLY: A changed circumstance such that it appears reasonably likely that he's going to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.

THE COURT: And if he is picked up for violating supervised release, your position is how long can you hold him?

MS. CONNOLLY: Well, your Honor, if he's picked up for violating supervised release, he certainly can't be indefinitely held. The -- ICE is permitted to see, okay, have conditions changed at this point? He's brought to our forefront. He's now a priority. Can we get these documents? Can we get him removed? If you look at the history of this case, that has played out. In each circumstance where it's been determined, no, he's now not likely to be removed, they've released him. That's what happened in 2009 with his initial release -- 2008 with his initial release, 2010 with his second release; and, again, on May 25th of this year, there was fresh information about that.

So, certainly, yes, he's bringing himself to ICE's attention with violating his conditions of release. ICE is permitted at that point to look and say, okay, have conditions changed? Can we effectuate his removal? Certainly, that is subject to all of the strictures in place from the Supreme Court and from the statutes. They can't hold him for, you know, five years while they're trying to see if they can remove him. Certainly, that's not happened in this case. Each time

they've released him upon discovering, okay, this still isn't going to happen; this still isn't going to happen.

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THE COURT: Why doesn't that resolve the -- why isn't the answer here that I write a memorandum and opinion saying here is the past record of what has happened? Here is what they state on the record their position is. Based on that, there's no likelihood he's just going to be randomly picked up. And if he's picked up in this manner, that wouldn't be cause for concern; and, therefore, it appears that this is moot. This is dismissed. And then if he does get picked up, you file again.

MS. LAFAILLE: Well, let me start with the that wouldn't be cause for concern portion of what your Honor just said. In the government's view, even if we just stick to what the government said now, one of Mr. Lunn's conditions of his release is that he follow doctor's orders, that he take every medication prescribed to him by a doctor. These are the conditions by which he's bound right now and for which he can be put, in the government's view, into detention for violating. Our view is that's not consistent with the Constitution, and because —

THE COURT: Wouldn't he have -- if he has problems with the terms of his supervised release, isn't there a procedure through Immigration for raising and seeking modification of those terms?

MS. LAFAILLE: I'm not aware that there is one, your

Honor, that would satisfy the requirements of due process. But

I think this goes to a more fundamental point here. Mr. Lunn

has been effectively in custody for the past nine years.

Now --

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understand, as a practical matter, that it may well feel like that to him. But you've got the courts and the agency trying to sort of balance a scheme where you have, on the one hand, due process concerns so that somebody isn't held with all of their liberties taken away; and, on the other hand, you have concern that the government has a right to say these are our borders and these are our rules; and if you don't have a right to be here, you don't get to just be wandering around. That's why, you know, they use these wonderful terms like paroling you into the country, and there's sort of this idea that you're here but you're not really here.

I mean, what you're saying is, at its core, you don't want him under release -- under supervision. There's no way you're going to be able certainly -- even if you could convince me of that, you're not going to convince anybody, as this thing would make its way up, that you're to be able to say --

MS. LAFAILLE: That's not our argument.

THE COURT: -- these people can go and not have custodial status or not have supervision because any

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supervision would be custodial.

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MS. LAFAILLE: Right. And that's not our argument. Our argument is that any re-detention has to be because of a reasonable likelihood that he's going to be removed.

THE COURT: That removes -- that takes -- that puts the agents -- puts the government and the courts in the position of saying, when these cases are presented to us, yeah, you know, you've got this nice due process rights, but we're worried about the community. So since we're not allowed to put any conditions of supervision, we're going to have to keep him in detention. That's where that argument pushes to. If you can't have enforceable conditions of release --

MS. LAFAILLE: Right.

THE COURT: -- everybody says, well, then just retain him. You're saying we prevailed -- he shouldn't be detained. But now that he's being released, you can't have -- you can't put restrictions on it.

MS. LAFAILLE: But, your Honor, I think -- there's a couple points I want to say. One is that we haven't had the opportunity to brief these issues, and we would like the chance to persuade your Honor that more is required by Zadvydas and by Clark than a world in which Mr. Lunn, someone with mental illness, with addiction, reflected -- as reflected in these very conditions of release, is subject to being re-detained any time he fails to take medication or runs into trouble with our

state criminal laws and held punitively -- essentially punitively for a period of time. That's an argument we would like to be able to brief and argue here on the merits.

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But as to mootness, the government has clearly not met its burden to show that there is no relief that Mr. Lunn could seek even if we were to take -- I mean, there's nothing, first of all, here that disavows the authority in 241.4, and that's why we think we're in line. We're well within the territory of Clark.

But also, I think, more directly in this case, we cannot ignore the affidavit of the person most closely involved with Mr. Lunn's custody, and that's Officer Piepiora, who says it will be necessary to detain Mr. Lunn for the simple purpose of making him appear for an interview.

There's a Cambodian consulate in Lowell, by the way, is the answer to your Honor's question about that. I don't know if that's where interviews are held, but I do know that there's a consulate there.

Because of issues like that, your Honor, there are disputes here. There are facts that I think we need to get to about exactly what has happened each time that Mr. Lunn has been re-detained. We don't have those records. We hope to get those records. You know, we hope to survive this stage of the case and get those records and be able to make argument here on the merits.

1 But it cannot be that Mr. Lunn is simply put in a place where he can be re-detained at any time and the only 2 answer is that, well, if it's a problem, he can gather up the 3 necessary resources to bring a habeas petition that a court 5 will likely not be able to adjudicate because he will be 6 released before that happens. THE COURT: Is there -- are there provisions for 7 challenging the terms of release? 8 9 MS. CONNOLLY: The order of supervision, your Honor? 03:25 10 THE COURT: Sorry? MS. CONNOLLY: I'm sorry. For challenging the order 11 of supervision? 12 13 THE COURT: Yeah. 14 MS. CONNOLLY: Your Honor, my understanding is that 1.5 the order of supervision is put in place by ICE; and, 16 certainly, if a petitioner wanted to challenge that, they could bring an APA complaint in the district court. That's my 17 understanding of that process. Now, I will say --18 19 THE COURT: There's no internal challenges to seeking 03:26 20 modification of conditions? 2.1 MS. CONNOLLY: Your Honor, I confess to the Court, I'm 22 still trying to get that answer from ICE. I asked them as 23 recently as this morning, and I'm still waiting to get specific 24 confirmation of that. Not that I'm aware of, but I can provide 25 that follow-up information to the Court.

Certainly, your Honor, it's -- with respect to the mootness argument, it is our position that -- as the Court is aware, that this is moot. And, certainly, his habeas petition requested his release and asked for a future order. He has been released. The future order they're asking for would be barred by 1252.

And with respect to his conditions of release, your Honor, certainly, one, that wasn't part of their petition, of course, because at the time he was being detained, and so they're raising it in their opposition and now arguing. But even putting that procedural issue aside, these conditions have — are appropriate under the case law. They are appropriate under Zadvydas. There's courts in this — in the District of Massachusetts who have looked at conditions and found that they are not a constitutional violation. And so — and conditions such as the ones in this case.

So, I mean, that's sort of jumping ahead to the merits. But, again, your Honor, it's our position that, short of him being released without any conditions at all, which, essentially, I guess, is what he's asking for, one, that's not even appropriately before this Court at this time; but, two, that's not a viable option given the explicit language of Zadvydas, which says that these conditions are permissible on release of an alien with a final order of removal.

THE COURT: Okay. I have lots to think about here. I

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will go back and read these cases a little bit further. I'll take it under submission.

MS. CONNOLLY: Thank you, your Honor.

THE CLERK: Court is in recess. All rise.

THE COURT: This is a matter unrelated to the proceedings here, but I just had a sentencing this morning regarding an unlawful reentry case. And as part of the facts involved there, this individual was arrested on his way -- was detained on his way into a court appearance in state court.

It really interferes with our judicial processes if we order people to appear and they're stopped from appearing before us or before the state courts on the courthouse steps.

They are then in violation of a court order because they were detained by the government.

So if you're talking to folks there, at least from this judge, that seems to be interfering with our court orders. I don't see any reason that the ICE officials can't walk into the courtroom and inform the judge what the issue is and that they would like the custody to go to them rather than to the state or rather than having the person released on their own recognition. But to stop an individual from complying with a court order seems problematic so if you could please convey that. Thank you.

MS. CONNOLLY: Yes, your Honor.

THE CLERK: All rise.

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1	(Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m. the hearing concluded.)
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5	<u>CERTIFICATE</u>
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8	I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript
9	of the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter to
10	the best of my skill and ability.
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16	/s/Cheryl Dahlstrom
17	Cheryl Dahlstrom, RMR, CRR
18	Official Court Reporter
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20	Dated: August 1, 2017
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